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Quick guide to responding to misinformation 
Misinformation can do damage
Misinformation is false information that is spread either by mistake or with intent to 
mislead. When there is intent to mislead, it is called disinformation. Misinformation has 
the potential to cause substantial harm to individuals and society. It is therefore important 
to protect people against being misinformed, either by making them resilient against 
misinformation before it is encountered or by debunking it after people have been exposed.
Misinformation can be sticky!
Fact-checking can reduce people’s beliefs in false information. However, misinformation 
often continues to influence people’s thinking even after they receive and accept a 
correction—this is known as the “continued influence effect” 1. Even if a factual correction 
seems effective—because people acknowledge it and it is clear that they have updated their 
beliefs—people frequently rely on the misinformation in other contexts, for example when 
answering questions only indirectly related to the misinformation. It is therefore important 
to use the most effective debunking approaches to achieve maximal impact.
Prevent misinformation from sticking if you can
Because misinformation is sticky, it’s best preempted. This can be achieved by explaining 
misleading or manipulative argumentation strategies to people—a technique known 
as “inoculation” that makes people resilient to subsequent manipulation attempts. A 
potential drawback of inoculation is that it requires advance knowledge of misinformation 
techniques and is best administered before people are exposed to the misinformation.
Debunk often and properly
If you cannot preempt, you must debunk. For debunking to be effective, it is important 
to provide detailed refutations 2, 3. Provide a clear explanation of (1) why it is now clear 
that the information is false, and (2) what is true instead. When those detailed refutations 
are provided, misinformation can be “unstuck.” Without detailed refutations, the 
misinformation may continue to stick around despite correction attempts.
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Misinformation can do damage
Misinformation damages society in a number of 
ways 4, 5. If parents withhold vaccinations from 
their children based on mistaken beliefs, public 
health suffers 6. If people fall for conspiracy theories 
surrounding COVID-19, they are less likely to 
comply with government guidelines to manage the 
pandemic 7, thereby imperiling all of us. 
It’s easy to be misled. Our feelings of familiarity and 
truth are often linked. We are more likely to believe 
things that we have heard many times than new 
information. 
“Objective truth is less important than 
familiarity: we tend to believe falsehoods 
when they are repeated sufficiently often.” 
This phenomenon is called the “illusory truth effect” 8, 9. Thus, the more people encounter a piece of 
misinformation they do not challenge, the more the misinformation seems true, and the more it sticks. Even if a 
source is identified as unreliable or is blatantly false and inconsistent with people’s ideology, repeated exposure to 
information still tilts people towards believing its claims 10, 11, 12, 13.
Misinformation is also often steeped in emotional language and designed to be attention-grabbing and have 
persuasive appeal. This facilitates its spread and can boost its impact 14, especially in the current online economy 
in which user attention has become a commodity 15.
Misinformation can also be intentionally suggested by “just asking questions”; a technique that allows 
provocateurs to hint at falsehoods or conspiracies while maintaining a facade of respectability 16. For example, in 
one study, merely presenting questions that hinted at a conspiracy relating to the Zika virus induced significant 
belief in the conspiracy 16. Likewise, if you do not read past a headline such as “Are aliens amongst us?” you might 
walk away with the wrong idea.
Where does misinformation come from?
Misinformation ranges from outdated news initially thought to be true and disseminated in good faith, 
to technically-true but misleading half-truths, to entirely fabricated disinformation spread intentionally 
to mislead or confuse the public. People can even acquire misconceptions from obviously fictional 
materials 17, 18. Hyper-partisan news sources frequently produce misinformation 19, which is then circulated 
by partisan networks. Misinformation has been shown to set the political agenda 20.
Definitions
Misinformation: False information that is 
disseminated, regardless of intent to mislead.
Disinformation: Misinformation that is deliberately 
disseminated to mislead.
Fake news: False information, often of a sensational 
nature, that mimics news media content.
Continued influence effect: The continued reliance 
on inaccurate information in people’s memory and 
reasoning after a credible correction has been 
presented. 
Illusory truth effect: Repeated information is more 
likely to be judged true than novel information 
because it has become more familiar.
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Misinformation can be sticky!
“Misinformation is sticky—even when it seems to have been corrected.”
A fundamental conundrum with misinformation is that even though corrections may seem to reduce people’s 
beliefs in false information, the misinformation often continues to influence people’s thinking—this is known as 
the “continued influence effect” 1.  The effect has been replicated many times. For example, someone might hear 
that a relative has fallen ill from food poisoning. Even if they later learn that the information was incorrect—and 
even if the person accepts and remembers this correction—they might still show a lingering reliance on the initial 
misinformation in different contexts (e.g., they might avoid the restaurant allegedly involved). 
Fact-checking and corrections appear to “work” when you ask people directly about their beliefs. For example, 
people may report the correction accurately and state that they no longer believe the original misinformation. But 
that doesn’t guarantee that the misinformation will not pop up elsewhere, for example when answering questions 
or making indirectly related decisions. 
Even though misinformation is sticky, we have opportunities to respond. We can prevent misinformation from 
taking root in the first place. Or we can apply best practices to debunk misinformation successfully. 
“Once experienced, even corrected misinformation can linger in memory 
but we can often undo its influence if we follow best practices.”
Sticky myths leave other marks
There is much evidence that updates to factual beliefs, even if successful, may not translate into attitude or 
behaviour change. For example, in polarized societies (e.g., the U.S.) people indicate that they will continue 
to vote for their favored politician even if they discover that the majority of the politician’s statements are 
false 21, 22, 23. Fortunately, it does not have to be that way. In less polarized societies (e.g., Australia), people’s 
voting intentions are sensitive to politicians’ truthfulness 24.
Nevertheless, do not refrain from debunking because you are worried it will not change behaviour. 
Successful debunking can affect behaviour—for example, it can reduce people’s willingness to spend money 
on questionable health products or their sharing of misleading content online 25, 26.
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Prevent misinformation from sticking if you can
As misinformation is hard to dislodge, preventing it from taking root in the first place is one fruitful strategy. 
Several prevention strategies are known to be effective.
Simply warning people that they might be misinformed can reduce later reliance on misinformation 27, 78. Even 
general warnings (“the media sometimes does not check facts before publishing information that turns out to be 
inaccurate”) can make people more receptive to later corrections. Specific warnings that content may be false have 
been shown to reduce the likelihood that people will share the information online 28.
The process of inoculation or “prebunking” includes a forewarning as well as a preemptive refutation and 
follows the biomedical analogy 29. By exposing people to a severely weakened dose of the techniques used in 
misinformation (and by preemptively refuting them), “cognitive antibodies” can be cultivated. For example, 
by explaining to people how the tobacco industry rolled out “fake experts” in the 1960s to create a chimerical 
scientific “debate” about the harms from smoking, people become more resistant to subsequent persuasion 
attempts using the same misleading argumentation in the context of climate change 30. 
The effectiveness of inoculation has been shown repeatedly and across many different topics 30, 31, 32, 33, 34. Recently, 
it has been shown that inoculation can be scaled up through engaging multimedia applications, such as 
cartoons 35 and games 36, 37. 
Simple steps to greater media literacy
Simply encouraging people to critically evaluate information as they read it can reduce the likelihood of 
taking in inaccurate information 38 or help people become more discerning in their sharing behavior 39.
Educating readers about specific strategies to aid in this critical evaluation can help people develop 
important habits. Such strategies include: Taking a “buyer beware” stance towards all information on social 
media; slowing down and thinking about the information provided, evaluating its plausibility in light of 
alternatives 40, 41; always considering information sources, including their track record, their expertise, 
and their motives 42; and verifying claims (e.g., through “lateral reading” 43) before sharing them 44. Lateral 
reading means to check other sources to evaluate the credibility of a website rather than trying to analyse the 
site itself. Many tools and suggestions for enhancing digital literacy exist 45. 
You cannot assume that people spontaneously engage in such behaviours 39. People do not routinely track, 
evaluate, or use the credibility of sources in their judgments 10. However, when they do, the impact of 
misinformation from less-credible sources can be reduced (see next textbox).
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The strategic landscape of debunking
If you are unable to prevent misinformation from sticking, then you have another arrow in your quiver: 
Debunking! However, you should first think about a few things before you start debunking.
Everyone has limited time and resources, so you need to pick your battles. If a myth is not spreading widely, 
or does not have the potential to cause harm now or in the future, there may be no point in debunking it. Your 
efforts may be better invested elsewhere, and the less said about an unknown myth the better.
Corrections have to point to the misinformation so they necessarily raise its familiarity. However, hearing about 
misinformation in a correction does little damage, even if the correction introduces a myth that people have 
never heard of before 46. Nonetheless, one should be mindful not to give undue exposure to fringe opinion and 
conspiracy claims through a correction. If no one has heard of the myth that earwax can dissolve concrete, why 
correct it in public?
Debunkers should also be mindful that any correction necessarily reinforces a rhetorical frame (i.e., a set of 
“talking points”) created by someone else. You cannot correct someone else’s myth without talking about it. In 
that sense, any correction—even if successful—can have unintended consequences, and choosing one’s own frame 
may be more beneficial. For example, highlighting the enormous success and safety of a vaccine might create a 
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Myth is largely unknown
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•  Explain misleading 
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information,
withhold debunking
so you set agenda.
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Who should debunk?
Successful communication rests on the communicator’s credibility. 
Information from sources that are perceived to be credible typically creates stronger beliefs 48 and is more 
persuasive 49, 50. By and large, this also holds for misinformation 51, 52, 53. However, credibility may have limited 
effects when people pay little attention to the source 54, 55, or when the sources are news outlets rather than 
people 56, 57.
Source credibility also matters for corrections of misinformation, although perhaps to a lesser extent 51, 53. 
When breaking down credibility into trustworthiness and expertise, perceived trustworthiness of a 
debunking source may matter more than its perceived expertise 58, 59. Sources with high credibility on both 
dimensions (e.g., health professionals or trusted health organizations) may be ideal choices 60, 61, 62. 
It is worth keeping in mind that the credibility of a source will matter more to some groups than others, 
depending on content and context 60, 63. For example, people with negative attitudes toward vaccines distrust 
formal sources of vaccine-related information (including generally-trusted health organizations) 64. 
Tailor the message to the audience and use a messenger trusted by the target group 65. Discredit 
disinformation sources that have vested interests 53.
The elusive backfire effects
Ten years ago, scholars and practitioners were concerned that corrections may “backfire”; that is, ironically 
strengthen misconceptions rather than reduce them. Recent research has allayed those concerns: backfire effects 
occur only occasionally and the risk of occurrence is lower in most situations than once thought. 
Do not refrain from attempting to debunk or 
correct misinformation out of fear that doing 
so will backfire or increase beliefs in false 
information 66, 67, 68. 
“Backfire effects are not as common as we used to think. We cannot 
reliably predict the circumstances under which they occur.”
Definition 
Backfire Effect: A backfire effect is where a correction 
inadvertently increases belief in, or reliance on,  
misinformation relative to a pre-correction or no-
correction baseline. 
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Familiarity backfire effect
Repetition makes information more familiar, and familiar information is generally perceived to be more truthful 
than novel information (the aforementioned illusory-truth effect). Because a myth is necessarily repeated when 
it is debunked, the risk arises that debunking may backfire by making a myth more familiar (see figure below). 
Early evidence was supportive of this idea, but more recently, exhaustive experimental attempts to induce a 
backfire effect through familiarity alone have come up empty 69, 70. Thus, while repeating misinformation generally 
increases familiarity and truth ratings, repeating a myth while refuting it has been found to be safe in many 
circumstances, and can even make the correction more salient and effective 71.
“Debunking a myth makes it more familiar but the debunking usually 
overpowers the increase in familiarity.”
Overkill backfire effect
This effect refers to the idea that providing “too many” counterarguments against a false claim might produce 
unintended effects or even backfire. The only study to directly examine this notion, however, found no evidence 
for this effect and instead concluded that a greater number of relevant counterarguments generally leads to 
greater reduction of misconceptions 69.
Worldview backfire effect
The worldview backfire effect is presumed to occur when a correction that challenges people’s worldview 
increases belief in the misinformation. While there was initially some evidence for the worldview backfire effect 72, 
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Personal experience vs. evidence
Although communicators may observe backfire effects in their everyday lives, many experiments have 
shown that, in fact, such behavior is unusual. Social scientists are still figuring out why some people 
“backfire” but not others, and why those effects occur on some occasions but not others. However, the 
accumulated evidence to date is clear that the worldview backfire effect is not a sufficient reason to avoid 
debunking and fact-checking.
Several studies have failed to obtain a backfire effect even in theoretically favourable circumstances 22, 23, 67, 73, 74. 
Thus, while there are reports of worldview backfire effects emerging under specific conditions (e.g., when 
Republicans are presented with information concerning climate mitigation measures 75) concern about worldview 
backfire has been disproportionate.
Role of worldview in belief confirmation
Even if worldview backfire effects are infrequent, there are other ways that worldview can affect debunking. 
Worldview can affect what content people choose to consume 76, 77, 78. This process of selective exposure may 
mean that people are more likely to be exposed to worldview-consonant false or misleading claims in the 
first place, and by implication, less likely to be exposed to corrective information about such claims after 
exposure. To illustrate, one analysis showed that 62% of visits to fake news websites came from the 20% of 
Americans with the most conservative information diet 77.
The efficacy of corrections depends in part on the recipient’s willingness to believe the statement. Activating 
group identities likely induces constraints in how people think about an issue—depending on the identity 
and the issue, this may ameliorate or exacerbate misperceptions, and it may affect whom a person will 
believe. This highlights the importance of using inclusive language and avoiding the stigmatization of groups 
for holding inaccurate beliefs. Doing so is likely to polarize more than generate desired updating. 
Recent research suggests that although (mis-)information diets may differ across the political spectrum, 
some of the motivated reasoning processes just described may be symmetric for liberals and conservatives 79.
“On balance, recent evidence provides no reason to avoid debunking 
for fear of a backfire effect. Debunking is likely to be at least partially 
effective, except for some limited circumstances when  
people’s worldviews are being challenged.”
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Debunk often and do it properly
Simple corrections on their own are unlikely to fully unstick misinformation. Tagging something as questionable 
or from an untrustworthy source is not enough in the face of repeated exposures.
Debunking is more likely to be successful if you apply the following 3 or 4 components: 
FACT: State the truth first
If it’s easy to do in a few clear words, state what is true first. This allows you to frame the message—you lead 
with your talking points, not someone else’s. 
The best corrections are as prominent (in the headlines, not buried in questions) as the misinformation. 
Do not rely on a simple retraction (“this claim is not true”). 
Providing a factual alternative, that is an alternative that fills a causal “gap” in explaining what happened if 
the misinformation is corrected, is an effective method of debunking. Having a causal alternative facilitates 
“switching out” the inaccurate information in an individual’s initial understanding and replaces it with a new 
version of what happened. 
The alternative should not be more complex and should have the same explanatory relevance as the original 
misinformation 1, 80, 81.
There may, however, be circumstances in which the facts are so nuanced that they escape pithy summary. In 







Lead with the fact if it’s clear, pithy, 
and sticky—make it simple, concrete,
and plausible. It must “fit” with the story.
Warn beforehand that a myth is coming...
mention it once only.
Explain how the myth misleads.
Finish by reinforcing the fact—multiple
times if possible. Make sure it provides
an alternative causal explanation.
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MYTH: Point to misinformation
Repeat the misinformation, only once, directly prior to the correction. One repetition of the myth is 
beneficial to belief updating 27, 71, 82, 83. 
But needless repetitions of the misinformation should be avoided: Although backfire effects are uncommon, 
we know that repetition makes information appear true 84, 85, 86.
Corrections are most successful if people are suspicious, or made to be suspicious, of the source or intent of 
the misinformation 87.
FALLACY: Explain why misinformation is wrong
Juxtapose the correction with the mistaken information. Ensure the rebuttal is clearly and saliently paired 
with the misinformation. It should be virtually impossible for the individual to ignore, overlook, or not 
notice the corrective element, even when skimming 27, 88, 89.
Rather than only stating that the misinformation is false, it is beneficial to provide details as to why. Explain 
(1) why the mistaken information was thought to be correct in the first place and (2) why it is now clear it 
is wrong and (3) why the alternative is correct 81, 90, 91. It is important for people to see the inconsistency in 
order to resolve it 71, 83. 
Such detailed corrections promote sustained belief change over time and protect against belief regression 
(i.e., a return to pre-correction beliefs 2, 52, 92).
If possible, explain why the misinformation is wrong not only by providing a factual alternative but by 
pointing out logical or argumentative fallacies underlying the misinformation. A practical advantage 
of uncovering fallacies 66 is that they are not domain specific, and people can therefore benefit from the 
debunking in other content domains as well. Once you know that climate misinformation relies on cherry-
picking 79 or incoherence 93, you may detect similar bad argumentation among anti-vaccination activists.
FACT: State the truth again
Restate the fact again, so the fact is the last thing people process. 
Even with detailed refutations, the effects will wear off over time 3, 52, so be prepared to debunk repeatedly!
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General guidelines:
Avoid scientific jargon or complex, technical language 94.
Well-designed graphs, videos, photos, and other semantic aids can be helpful to convey corrections involving 
complex or statistical information clearly and concisely 95, 96, 97.
The truth is often more complicated than some viral false claim. You must invest effort in translating complicated 
ideas so they are readily accessible to the target audience—so they can be easily read, easily imagined, and easily 
recalled 98, 99, 100.
Collective action: Debunking on social media
Accuracy nudges (e.g., “most people want to receive accurate information”) and reminders increase the quality of 
people’s sharing decisions on social media 39.
Mobilize social media users to respond quickly to misinformation by sharing facts. A platform’s efforts may not 
be sufficient in scope or scalable to misinformation; user correction can work if people feel emboldened to engage 
in it 101, 102.
“Focus on interpersonal effects in online communication:  
‘see something, say something’ ” 102.
Individuals have the ability to make a difference online: Corrections from users, experts, and algorithms 
(e.g., recommending related articles that contain a correction) can all be effective in reducing community 
misperceptions when responding to misinformation 103, 104, 105.
Seeing someone else on social media being corrected (known as observational corrections) can lead to more 
accurate attitudes on various topics 61. 
Conversely, not speaking out can lead to a “spiral of silence”, both for the person being corrected and for the 
observer, where a mute majority cedes a narrative to a vocal but misinformed minority 106, 107, 108.
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Do not rely on a simple retraction 
(“this claim is not true”).
Lead with the fact if it’s clear, pithy, 
and sticky—make it simple, concrete,
and plausible.
Warn that a myth is coming.
Explain how the myth misleads.
Finish by reinforcing the fact.
Repeat the fact multiple times 
if possible.
Just as a detective finds clues in a crime scene, 
scientists have found many clues in climate 
measurements confirming humans are causing 
global warming. Human-caused global warming is 
a measured fact.
Scientists observe human fingerprints all 
over our climate
The warming effect from greenhouse gases like 
carbon dioxide has been confirmed by many lines 
of evidence. Aircraft and satellites measure less 
heat escaping to space at the exact wavelengths 
that carbon dioxide absorbs energy. The upper 
atmosphere cools while the lower atmosphere 
warms—a distinct pattern of greenhouse 
warming. 
A common climate myth is that climate has always 
changed naturally in the past, therefore modern 
climate change must be natural also.
This argument commits the single cause fallacy, 
falsely assuming that because natural factors 
have caused climate change in the past, then 
they must always be the cause of climate change.
This logic is the same as seeing a murdered body 
and concluding that people have died of natural 
causes in the past, so the murder victim must 
have also died of natural causes.
Provide a factual alternative that  fills a 
causal “gap”, explaining what happened 
if the misinformation is corrected.
Repeat the misinformation, only once, 
directly prior to the correction.
Point out logical or argumentative 
fallacies underlying the 
misinformation.
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